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5Abstract
This paper argues that uncertainty as to the sustainability of a country’s budgetary
position will frustrate budgetary stabilisers to operate as a stabilisation device.
Therefore, rather than irrelevant or harmful, the disciplinary incentive offered by the
Stability Pact is even beneficial from a stabilisation point of view. This implies that the
common trade-off between rules (of the Stability Pact to prevent the externalities from
unsustainable budget balances) and flexibility (required to stabilise output) does not
hold in this case. The empirical results presented in the paper indicate that a substantial,
statistically significant and robust partial relation exists between government debt on the
one hand and the degree of actual stabilisation on the other hand. In passing, this paper
provides evidence that the degree of intertemporal budgetary stabilisation in EU
countries is at least as large as the degree of interregional stabilisation built-in in the US
federal budget.
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71 Introduction
One of the most pressing issues of Economic and Monetary Union for both economists
and policymakers is whether monetary union requires closer co-ordination of budgetary
policy than currently envisaged by the excessive deficit procedure and the Stability and
Growth Pact. Basically, such closer co-ordination may be desirable because of the
negative spillovers associated with unsustainable budgetary deficits, because of
stabilisation and policy mix purposes or to provide risk insurance. This paper will focus
on the relation between the first and the second rationale. Nowadays, most economists
acknowledge that the negative externalities of unsustainable deficits justify some
restrictions on budgetary policy of individual Member States participating in EMU. At
the same time, it has been argued that the fiscal straitjacket of the Stability and Growth
Pact unnecessary limits countries to cushion asymmetric shocks by means of automatic
or budgetary fiscal policy (e.g. Goodhart and Smith, 1993; Masson, 1996; Eichengreen
and Von Hagen, 1996). Others have argued that the Stability and Growth Pact does not
limit countries in pursuing budgetary stabilisation as the Pact explicitly requires
Member States to have a budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus. Even
stronger, the Pact requires Member States explicitly to strive for a medium term budget
balance that leaves sufficient budgetary room for manoeuvre for letting the automatic
stabilisers operate over the cycle.
This paper goes one step further by arguing that the Stability Pact – if correctly
implemented – may even stimulate stabilisation. The reason is that, with or without the
Stability Pact, countries will be constrained by the intertemporal budget constraint. The
more uncertainty exists about the sustainability of the budgetary position of a country,
the less room for manoeuvre a country will have for allowing the budget to act as a
stabilisation devise. This implies that – rather than irrelevant or harmful – the
disciplinary incentive offered by the Stability Pact to pursue prudent budgetary policies
is even beneficial from a stabilisation point of view. This line of reasoning suggests that
the common trade-off between rules (of the Stability Pact to prevent the externalities
from unsustainable budget balances) and flexibility (required to stabilise output) does
not hold in this case.
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is twofold. The main objective
is to investigate the relation between budgetary sustainability and budgetary
stabilisation. Addressing this question requires estimates of the degree of budgetary
stabilisation in the countries concerned. Here the second (and secondary) purpose of this
paper comes into play. On the basis of the stabilisation coefficients it is investigated
whether European countries need a federal mechanism like the US in order to generate
an adequate degree of (automatic) stabilisation.
The following of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly touches
upon the rationale of having strict, one-size-fits-all, numerical rules for fiscal policy on
top of the safeguards already included in the Treaty to prevent (the negative spillovers
of) budgetary profligacy. Moreover, it goes more deeply into the relation between
budgetary stabilisation and budgetary sustainability.
8As to the best of our knowledge calculations on the degree of budgetary stabilisation
exist only for a few European countries, section 3 estimates budgetary stabilisation
coefficients for 13 EU countries. An error correction specification is used to estimate
the impact of the output gap on the budget balance. The outcomes of this exercise are
compared with existing estimates for US states. This gives some indication as to
whether the intertemporal stabilisation provided for by national budgets is comparable
in size with the interregional stabilisation offered by the federal budget in the US. In
addition, a comparison is made with existing estimates of the OECD, the European
commission and the IMF, for the (automatic) cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance.
The fundamental difference between these latter estimates and the regression estimates
in section 3 is that the former may be interpreted as the potential degree of automatic
stabilisation, whereas the latter measures the actual (automatic and discretionary)
degree of budgetary stabilisation pursued by countries over the sample period.
Section 4 investigates three potential hypotheses explaining the budgetary
stabilisation coefficients found in section 3. Besides the hypothesis that lack of
budgetary prudence limits the extent of budgetary stabilisation, it is investigated
whether the size of the government and the degree of openness correlate positively resp.
negatively with the extent of budgetary stabilisation. Section 5 summarises the main
findings and concludes.
2 Sustainability and stabilisation: some conceptual considerations
Budgetary sustainability
It is by now generally accepted that an unsustainable debt accumulation of one or more
EMU Member States may hinder the ECB in complying with its primary objective of
(internal) monetary stability. The negative externalities of lax budgetary policies
include, among other things, its impact on interest, inflation and exchange rates in the
monetary union and the potential pressure on the central monetary authorities to impose
an inflation tax or to monetize debt. Moreover, limits on debt accumulation intend to
avoid that Member States have to choose between a default on government debt of an
insolvent EMU Member State on the one hand and bailing-out the country concerned on
the other. Finally, undisciplined budgetary policy of an individual Member State may
interfere with a balanced policy mix at the euro level, which would undermine the
credibility and adequacy of the common monetary policy of the ECB.
It has been argued that a more sophisticated design than simply capping the maximum
deficit at an arbitrary value would have been appropriate. Yet, the first experience with
the implementation of the Stability Pact, including its procedure on budgetary
surveillance, suggests that the Pact might develop into an effective device to prevent
unsustainable budgetary positions. Moreover, a more sophisticated design would require
the introduction of discretionary elements for assessing whether a fiscal position is
'excessive' in the jargon of the Treaty. The introduction of discretionary elements could
seriously hamper the efficacy of the budgetary rules. First, depending on their exact
9nature, more sophisticated arrangements2 might give rise to information problems and
moral hazard. Second, a credibility problem arises as the room for discretion may be
used for de facto softening the budgetary arrangements.3 Irrespective of whether
politicians would use their discretion in such a partisan way, the mere possibility that
they could do so already undermined the credibility of a more sophisticated
arrangement. Drawing up simple, numerical rules with minimal room for interpretation
partly obviates this credibility problem. Yet, it does not fully solve it because, as long as
no country has ever breached the budgetary rules of the Stability Pact, financial markets
have no actual proof that the Ecofin Council will really impose and enforce sanctions at
the moment the provisions of the Pact require doing so. Paradoxically, the more
successful the Stability Pact functions as a credible deterrent to decision-makers fearing
either the financial penalties or the political shame of breaching the budgetary rules, the
less probable it is that the Ecofin will be able to show its determination to enforce these
rules rigorously.
A second potential flaw of the Stability Pact is that it leaves insufficient room
for budgetary stabilisation at the national level. This is all the more important in EMU,
as participating Member States do not have the interest and exchange rate instrument at
their disposal. Moreover, it is generally taken for granted that alternative equilibrium
restoring mechanisms like price and wage flexibility and labour mobility function far
from optimal in most EMU Member States. Finally, EMU lacks a federal mechanism of
interregional transfer as in the US. Following the line of reasoning in the seminal paper
of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991), several authors have argued in favour of some
degree of fiscal federalism for the viability of monetary union (e.g. Masson and Taylor,
1993). In response, others (see e.g. Bayoumi and Masson, 1995; Fatás, 1998) have
noted that national budgets can in principle obtain the same extent of budgetary
stabilisation as provided for by the federal budget.
Budgetary stabilisation
Several economists have argued that stabilisation should take place at European
(federal) level rather than at national (regional) level. First, national governments will
provide less budgetary stabilisation than is deemed optimal from a European point of
view, as part of the stabilisation spills over to other countries or regions. National
(regional) governments have no incentive to take such externalities into account.
Although this argument holds true as a general notion, one might question its empirical
                                                          
2 Here, one could think of defining a deficit ceiling for the structural balance rather than for
the actual balance, distinguishing between permanent and temporary breaches of the
deficit ceiling, provisions related to the underlying cause for the breach of the deficit
ceiling, etc. Indeed, to some extent, suchlike clauses are included in the Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact.
3 It was for this reason that the former German Minister of Finance Theo Waigel called for
automatic and immediate sanctions for countries breaching the 3% ceiling in his initial
proposals for a Stability Pact. This would practically eliminate all discretionary room for
manoeuvre granted by the Treaty to the Ecofin Council in deciding (i) whether a deficit
exceeding 3% GDP is excessive and (ii) whether a financial sanction should be imposed.
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and analytical relevance. As to the empirical relevance, the cross-border effects of
budgetary stabilisation are generally thought to be minimal, whereas even uncertainty
exists as to the sign of this effect (see e.g. European Commission, 1990, Englander and
Egebo, 1993). The analytical relevance seems to be limited because it is not clear a
priori whether individual Member States offer too little or too much budgetary
stabilisation from an EMU point of view. In case of symmetric shocks, ignoring the
external effects will result in too little budgetary stabilisation from an EMU point of
view. However, in case of asymmetric shocks, budgetary stabilisation has adverse
externalities, resulting in too much budgetary stabilisation if these effects are ignored.
Taking into account that monetary policy remains available to deal with symmetric
shocks and, consequently, that budgetary stabilisation should be mainly directed at
asymmetric shocks, it might be concluded that – if anything – national governments
have an incentive to offer too much stabilisation from a European point of view.
A second reason why stabilisation by a central authority may be more effective
than stabilisation offered by a national (or regional) authority is that Ricardian
equivalence effects may be in place.4 In that case, agents will anticipate the impact of
intertemporal stabilisation on their future tax liability, mitigating the effect of changes
in net taxes and transfers on aggregate expenditure. Although this notion is widely
accepted, it should be noted that it only holds true to the extent shocks – and their
resulting impact on net taxes and transfers – are permanent. A temporary shock, i.e. a
deviation from trend GDP, will only have a negligible impact on lifetime disposable
income, irrespective of whether stabilisation takes place interregionally or
intertemporally. Consequently, the irrelevance between interregional and intertemporal
stabilisation in case of temporary shocks undermines the Ricardian equivalence
argument in favour of centralised stabilisation, as stabilisation is by its very nature
associated with temporary deviations from trend GDP. With respect to permanent
shocks, it may be argued that interregional transfers are undesirable for both equity and
economic reasons.5 As to the equity argument, net interregional transfers based on
permanent GDP shocks may lead to a permanent redistribution from relatively poor to
relatively rich Member States. This is because the process of economic catching-up of
the relatively poor countries may lead to convergence of GDP levels. Consequently,
countries with below average GDP levels may experience higher growth rates than the
relatively rich countries, making them net contributors in a system where net transfers
                                                          
4 Bayoumi and Masson (1998) present some evidence for Canada indicating that the
impact of a liability-creating provincial deficit on provincial consumption is only one-
third to one-half as large as the impact of a non-liability-creating federal deficit (specific
to the province).
5 See Fatás (1998) for a more elaborate exposition on the conceptual differences between
(intertemporal) stabilisation and (interregional) insurance.
11
are determined by permanent GDP shocks (see also Fatás, 1998, pp 186-91).6 From an
economic point of view, permanent budgetary flows in response to permanent shocks
may frustrate structural adjustment and give rise to moral hazard.
Thirdly, Krugman (1993) argues that budgetary stabilisation at the national
(regional) level may be frustrated due to the mobility of tax bases within a monetary
union. Again, one may doubt the relevance of this argument. A first thing to note is that
the empirical relevance of this argument remains to be seen, because, among other
things, it is hard to believe that tax bases move in response to temporary shocks or
temporary measures. Moreover, this argument seems not to apply to automatic
stabilisation. Automatic stabilisation implies that tax and social security arrangements
(including tax and contribution rates and benefit levels) remain constant over the cycle.
It is hard to see how in such a situation mobile tax bases frustrate budgetary
intertemporal stabilisation as compared with interregional stabilisation. Turning to
discretionary measures, it may even be argued that the mobility of tax bases improves
the efficacy of a counter-cyclical stabilisation policy. If a country lowers taxes during a
slump this may, if anything, attract labour and capital from abroad, thereby stimulating
domestic economic activity at home and broadening the domestic tax base.
The discussion above raises serious doubt as to the claim that – ignoring the
potential trade-off between the budgetary rules of the Stability Pact and the budgetary
flexibility required for stabilisation purposes – centralised stabilisation is inherently
superior to stabilisation at the national (regional) level. Hence, this makes the issue
whether such a trade-off exists all the more relevant. If such a trade-off would exist, it
could be argued that from an economic point of view some scope exists for introducing
federal elements in the European budget, in order to overcome this limitation.
One way to address this issue is to point at increasing evidence indicating that
countries maintaining an underlying fiscal position of close to balance or in surplus
create sufficient room for the budgetary stabilisers to operate (see e.g. Buti et al, 1997;
IMF, 1997). This would imply that the Stability and Growth Pact is irrelevant for the
issue of budgetary stabilisation. In this paper, we develop a different, though related
argument. This argument is that lack of budgetary prudence will limit a country's
leeway for stabilisation, be it automatic or discretionary. This holds true, with or
without budgetary rules as laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. The reason is
that countries are subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. The more doubt exists
about the budgetary sustainability of a country, the less room countries have (or take)
for budgetary stabilisation. This may be due to the fact that responsible decision-makers
realise the potential disastrous consequences of budgetary insolvency – in economic,
social, or political terms – or because governments are not prepared to pay an increasing
risk premium on their debt. Moreover, a budgetary stimulus in case of an adverse shock
may be less effective and therefore less desirable the more evidence exists that a country
                                                          
6 This is not an argument against redistribution as such, but merely against redistribution
based on permanent GDP shocks. To the extent that one wishes to redistribute income
among Member States, the level of GDP would be the logical variable determining
eligibility.
12
may be on an unsustainable budgetary path. The stronger the believe that government
finances are unsustainable, the more consumers belief that a program of budgetary
consolidation will occur rather sooner than later. This latter belief reduces the
possibility that the impact of the fiscal impulse on future disposable income can be
shifted onto future generations. Sutherland (1997) shows that a fiscal deficit can even
have a contractionary, i.e. anti-Keynesian, effect in such a case. The Stability and
Growth Pact, by disciplining countries to refrain from policies that could give rise to
even the slightest doubt about their budgetary sustainability, may for these reasons
enhance rather than limit the scope for stabilisation.
3 Calculating budgetary stabilisation coefficients
Whether or not countries experience a trade-off between budgetary sustainability and
budgetary stabilisation is in the end an empirical question. In order to investigate such a
relation, this section presents estimates of the cyclical impact on the budget balance of
13 EU countries. In this respect, this paper contributes to existing empirical evidence on
budgetary stabilisation in four ways. First, although ample research has been done as to
the degree of budgetary stabilisation at state (or regional) level in the US since Sachs
and Sala-i-Martin (1991), to the best of our knowledge, such estimates do not exist for a
majority of EU countries.
Second, unlike most other studies, we make use of (changes in) the output gap
rather than changes in GDP for measuring the cyclical sensitivity of the budget. The
reason is that budgetary stabilisation should – if anything – be directed at smoothing the
business cycle rather than smoothing GDP. Though no perfect measure for the business
cycle exists, it seems reasonable to assume that measures computed by the OECD and
the IMF at least outperform actual GDP as a measure for potential output or trend GDP.
Thirdly, rather than including only government revenue and expenditure
categories considered cyclically sensitive, we look at the balance of total revenue and
expenditure categories, i.e. we focus on the cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance.
For one thing, this prevents us from making sometimes-arbitrary assumptions as to
whether a certain revenue or expenditure category is cyclically sensitive. How to
interpret, for example, the balanced budget requirement of social security funds which
applies in several countries? Such a requirement is attended with discretionary
adjustments in contribution rates in response to GDP changes. These adjustments,
though discretionary in the sense that they require an explicit policy decision, are also
automatic in a way because they follow more or less automatically from the underlying
policy rule. Also the often-applied policy practice not to redress a-cyclical budgetary
setbacks if they are compensated by cyclical windfalls (and vice versa), may to some
extent be considered as a policy automatism which should be captured by measuring the
cyclical impact on the budget. More generally, estimating the cyclical sensitivity of the
budget by including the actual policy response of governments to the cycle is in itself a
relevant measure. In the end, it is the total amount of stabilisation – both automatic and
discretionary – that determines the stabilisation properties of budgetary policy.
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Finally, as opposed to previous investigations, we explicitly take into account that the
impact of the cycle on the budget may take place with a lag. There are several reasons
for such lags to occur. For one thing, unemployment related changes in tax on labour
income as well as unemployment related benefits follow the cycle with a lag of about
three quarters of a year or so. Moreover, to the extent that discretionary budgetary
policy takes place in response to the cycle, a policy lag will arise, as both the decision-
making and the implementation of budgetary measures take some time.
Methodological issues
An error correction specification is used as a starting point for the time series analysis
on the relation between the output gap and the general government budget balance, for
both statistical and theoretical reasons. For a majority of countries, the existence of a
unit root in either the output gap or the budget balance or both could not be rejected at
conventional confidence intervals on the basis of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test. This
may be surprising, as non-stationarity of both the output gap and the budget balance
may be ruled out from a theoretical point of view. Nevertheless, the statistical evidence
of a unit root may complicate the interpretation of the regression results if the relation
between the output gap and the budget balance is estimated in levels. In addition, an
error correction specification is more suitable to capture both the short run impact of the
cycle on the budgetary position and a possible long run relationship. In contrast, a
specification in levels would be more appropriate to estimate the long run effect.
Regardless of the above-mentioned statistical objections to estimating in levels, a
specification that focuses on the long run effect is also less suitable from a theoretical
point of view. This follows from the fact that the output gap is by construction a
variable that hovers around (a constant value slightly below) zero. Thus, the long run
value of the output gap is (nearly) constant. This latter needs not to be the case for the
budget balance. Obviously, a variable with a stable average value cannot be expected to
explain the long run movements in the budget balance which for most European
countries have occurred during the last 20 years or so. At the same time, a long run
relation between the budget balance and the output gap cannot be ruled out for those
countries where the budget balance moves around a more or less stable long run value.
Hence, the following specification will be used as a starting point for the empirical
analysis:
Eq. (1) ∆ D0  = c + β1 ∆ G0 + β2 ∆ G-1 + β3 D-1 + β4 G-1 + ε
Here, D denotes the budget balance (a negative value indicates a deficit), G the output
gap (which is positive if actual GDP exceeds potential GDP), ε the error term, and ∆ the
difference operator. The subscript refers to time.
In this equation, the sensitivity coefficients β1 and β2 represent the
contemporaneous resp. the lagged budgetary impact effect with respect to a change in
output gap. It follows that the sum of β1 and β2 equals the accumulated stabilisation
coefficient. Furthermore, β1 (β2) divided by the sum of β1 and β2 gives the relative
share of the contemporaneous (lagged) stabilisation coefficient. Splitting up the cyclical
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effect into a contemporaneous effect and a lagged effect has implications for the
interpretation of the t-values and the assessment on significance. Though equation (1)
captures the cyclical impact effect on the cycle by two coefficients, from an economic
point of view they represent only one and the same transmission channel, notably the
cyclical effect on the budget. Obviously, the smaller the share of either the
contemporaneous or the lagged effect in the total cyclical effect on the budget, the less
probable that a significant coefficient will be found. This may lead to incorrectly
dropping one of the two variables. Therefore, besides assessing significance levels by
looking at the t-values of the individual variables, a Wald test on the joint significance
of β1 and β2 will be executed. Of course, the possible drawback of relying on the joint
significance of β1 and β2 is that the null hypothesis of no joint significance may be
rejected if only one of the two variables appears to be very significant. On the basis of
these considerations, the evaluation of whether or not a marginally insignificant
coefficient is included will – besides on the basis of the Wald test on joint significance -
- also be determined by the overall fit of the equation.
The joint effect of β3 and β4 represents the error correction component and
indicates whether, and to what extent, a long run relation exists between the output gap
and the budget balance. The long run coefficient can be calculated from equation (1) by
(-β3/β4).
For all countries, we systematically checked for the significance of a dummy
variable on the constant for the remaining years in the nineties. A significant dummy in
the beginning of the nineties could point at a 'Maastricht effect' inducing governments
to consolidate their financial balance in time in order to comply with the Maastricht
criteria.7 A significant dummy around 1996 captures the same effect, but may also be
due to one-off budgetary measures. Obviously, such measures limit the informational
content of the budget balance for our purpose, as they blur the underlying relation
between the cycle and the budget balances. In either case, it is expected that the
coefficient for the dummy concerned is positive.
Initially, regressions were run for all EU countries, except Luxembourg. For
Greece, no stable empirical relationship could be found on the basis of equation (1).
Although the basic sample period covers 1975-1998, lack of data availability made it
necessary to shorten the sample period in six cases, notably Ireland (data available as
from 1977), Belgium, Finland, and the UK (data available as from 1978), Sweden
(1983), and Denmark (1988). In addition, in case of three countries, shortening the
sample period by suppressing the first observations improved the fit of the equation
because the first observations were outside the confidence interval of 5% around the
fitted values. Thus, for Austria and Spain the beginning of the regression period was
shortened to 1976 resp. 1980, whereas for Ireland shortening took place from 1978 to
1982. For Germany, the observations for 1990 and 1991 were suppressed because of
German unification. This leads to three missing years in the estimation output, notably
                                                          
7 Note that the Maastricht Treaty allows the launch of monetary union already as from the
first of 1997. It was not until the European Council in december 1995 that is was decided
to start EMU at the latest possible date allowed for in the Treaty.
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’89, ’90, and ’91. One of the consequences of eliminating two observations is that the
Breusch-Godfrey statistic testing for serial correlation cannot be calculated anymore.
Finally, for Portugal, the time series for the budget balance shows an outlier in 1980: the
budget balance improves from a deficit of 6.2% GDP in 1979 to a surplus of 5.5% GDP
in 1980 and then returns to a deficit of –10.5% GDP in ’81. We dropped this
observation, thereby missing both 1979 and 1980 in the regression output.
Results
Table 1 summarises the regression results of equation (1) for thirteen countries, i.e. the
EU 15 excluding Luxembourg and Greece. Column (3) of table 1 displays the average
cumulative stabilisation coefficient of the budget balance with respect to (a change in)
the output gap, which amounts to 0.53. Ignoring the cumulative impact coefficient for
Sweden, which is a serious outlier with a value of 1.6, the average value falls with about
0.1 to 0.44.
Table 1 Stabilisation coefficients; results of regression analysis; various sample
periods
Country Contemporaneous
stabilisation effect
Lagged
stabilisation effect
Cumulative
stabilisation effect
(β1) (β2) (β1 + β2)
Austria 0.15 0.34 0.49
Belgium 0.61 -0.50 0.11
Denmark 0.29 0.33 0.62
Finland 0.56 0.24 0.80
France 0.35 0.13 0.48
Germany 0.25 - 0.25
Ireland 0.15 - 0.15
Italy 0.41 - 0.41
Netherlands 0.36 0.23 0.59
Portugal 0.22 0.19 0.41
Spain 0.41 - 0.41
Sweden 1.63 - 1.63
UK 0.31 0.26 0.57
Average coefficient
Average excl. Sweden
Average excl Belgium
0.45
0.36
0.13
0.22
0.53
0.44
See table A1 in the appendix for a more detailed presentation of the results; a positive
output gap implies that actual GDP exceeds potential GDP; a budget deficit (surplus) is
defined negatively (positively); a positive coefficient therefore indicates that an increase
in the output gap is associated with a decline (increase) in the budget deficit (surplus).
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The average contemporaneous impact effect amounts to 0.45. Ignoring Sweden, the
average impact coefficient falls with about 0.1 to 0.36. For eight countries, including a
lagged impact effect, improved the fit of the regression. Excluding the negative lagged
coefficient for Belgium, the average lagged stabilisation coefficient is slightly above
0.2. In all cases where the lagged coefficients are included, the Wald test statistic
confirmed the joint significance of both the contemporaneous and the lagged impact
effect at conventional levels, though for Denmark only at 90% (see table A1 in the
appendix).
Interestingly, the average stabilisation coefficient exceeds the value generally
found for US interregional stabilisation offered by the federal level. Indeed, Sala-i-
Martin and Sachs (1991) estimate that about 65% of regional pre-tax income shocks are
transmitted to fluctuations in disposable income, implying a stabilisation coefficient of
about 0.35. By now, it is generally acknowledged that the results of Sala-i-Martin and
Sachs give an upper limit for the degree of interregional budgetary stabilisation offered
by the federal budget, as their estimates capture both budgetary stabilisation and
budgetary redistribution (or insurance). Subsequent calculations (see e.g. Bayoumi and
Eichengreen, 1995) which do take this distinction into account, suggest that the
interregional budgetary stabilisation coefficient amounts to about 0.3. All in all, our
results seem to confirm that intertemporal stabilisation at the national level can in
principle obtain the same degree of stabilisation compared to interregional stabilisation
at the federal level.
It is interesting to compare the actual stabilisation coefficients with the
estimates for the cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance. These estimates are
displayed in table 2. The OECD, the European Commission and the IMF have executed
such estimates, using different methods but all making a 'no-policy-change' assumption.
In this latter respect, these estimates differ conceptually from the coefficients shown in
table 1, as discussed above.8 Therefore, one might interpret the coefficients in table 2 as
the degree of automatic stabilisation of the budget, whereas the results in table 1 give
the degree of actual stabilisation.
                                                          
8 Moreover, data for the budget balance used to calculate the stabilisation coefficients also
include one-off factors. To the extent that these factors do not correlate systematically
with the output gap, there is no reason to expect a bias in the coefficients calculated by
means of equation (1).
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Table 2 Cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance; calculations from OECD,
European Commission and IMF
Country OECD EU IMF
Austria 0.5 0.5 0.6
Belgium 0.6 0.6 0.6
Denmark 0.6 0.7 0.8
Finland 0.6 0.6 0.6
France 0.6 0.5 0.6
Germany 0.5 0.5 0.5
Ireland 0.4 0.5 0.5
Italy 0.3 0.5 0.4
Netherlands 0.6 0.8 0.7
Portugal 0.5 0.5 0.4
Spain 0.6 0.6 0.7
Sweden 0.7 0.9 1.1
UK 0.5 0.6 0.6
Average 0.54 0.60 0.62
The coefficients give the effect of a 1% improvement of the output gap on the budget
balance (in % GDP); a budget deficit (surplus) is defined negatively (positively).
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 62, December 1997, p. 24.
Comparing the results in table 1 with those in table 2, it appears that, on average, EU
countries did not allow the automatic stabilisers to operate freely. Had they done so, one
would expect an actual stabilisation coefficient of around 0.55-0.60, rather than the 0.45
in table 1. Again, there are substantial differences among countries. The Swedish degree
of actual stabilisation exceeds the degree of automatic stabilisation substantially. On the
other hand, we see for countries like Belgium and Ireland that the actual stabilisation
coefficient is far less than the automatic stabilisation coefficient. The next section tries
to account for these differences.
4 Budgetary sustainability and budgetary stabilisation: is there a trade-off ?
In this section, we investigate three hypotheses explaining the differences in the
stabilisation coefficients in table 1. A first hypothesis is that the degree of actual
stabilisation depends on the size of the government. A large government sector will be
characterised by high (average and marginal) tax rates, and by a generous social security
system. Obviously, this will have an impact on the extent in which the business cycle
influences the budget balance. We will use government expenditure as a share of GDP
as a measure for the size of the government. A second hypothesis is that relatively open
economies provide for less stabilisation, as for these countries a relatively large part of
the stabilisation effort will spillover to other countries due to the import leakage. The
degree of openness will be measured as the average of the share of imports and exports
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in GDP. The third hypothesis – and the central empirical issue raised in this paper – is
that the degree of (actual) stabilisation is determined by the financial position of the
government. A country that has accumulated large deficits may feel that there is only
limited room for a further deterioration of its financial position (see section 2).
Below, we will use two measures for budgetary sustainability. The first
measure is the average debt level (general government) as a share of GDP, whereby the
average will be taken from the period over which the stabilisation coefficient is
measured for the individual countries. A second measure concerns the average budget
balance (again general government) over the relevant period. On theoretical grounds,
we prefer the average debt ratio as an indicator for budgetary sustainability of the
government's financial position during the specific period concerned. Unlike the budget
balances, data for the debt as a share of GDP correct for differences in (average) ex post
growth rates between countries. Whether or not an average budgetary deficit of, say, 5%
GDP leads to an unsustainable financial position, depends in an important way on the
nominal (!) growth rate of the economy concerned. Moreover, the average deficit over a
certain period of time ignores the initial financial position of the government. The
relevance of these effects is illustrated by comparing the debt and deficit ratios of
Belgium and Italy. Although the average budget deficit of Italy is with 9.5% GDP about
2,5% GDP above the average Belgian deficit of 7.0% GDP, the average Belgian debt
ratio is some 30% above the Italian debt ratio (120% GDP versus 90% GDP).9
In sum, we estimate the influence of three determinants, notably government
size (SIZE), openness (OPN), and budgetary sustainability (SUST), on the actual
stabilisation coefficients (STAB) in the following way:
Eq. (2) STAB = α1 SIZE + α2 SUST + α3 OPN
We estimate this relation by simple OLS. Regressions were performed both with and
without Sweden included in the sample, in order to control for possible outlier effects.
This is indicated in the column 'remarks' by ' incl.' resp. 'excl. Swd'. Table 3 below
reveals the results.
                                                          
9 Obviously, if one would like to have a measure for the future sustainability, the
(development of the) budget balance over the last couple of years would probably be a
better indicator than the debt ratio.
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Table 3 Impact of government size, budgetary sustainability (debt), and openness
on the degree of stabilisation
                        Explanatory variables
Government size Budgetary
Sustainability
Openness R2 / R2-adj. Remarks
Eq. (1) 1.80*** - 0.57** - 19.57 0.53 / 0.43 Excl. Swd; no
const.
Eq. (2) 1.75*** - 0.64***       - 0.52 / 0.47 Excl. Swd; no
const.
Eq. (3) 2.29*** - 0.92**       - 0.48 / 0.43 Incl. Swd; no
const.
Eq. (4) 1.13 - 0.62***       - 0.55 / 0.45 Excl. Swd; with
const
Eq. (5) 3.62** - 0.91**       - 0.54 / 0.45 Incl. Swd; with
const
Eq. (6) 1.66***   0.48**       - 0.50 / 0.45 Excl. Swd; Gvmt
income
Eq. (7) 2.18***   0.71**       - 0.48 / 0.43 Incl. Swd; Gvmt
income
Explanatory variables are measured as percentage of GDP; the coefficients indicate the
partial relation between the explanatory variables and the actual cumulative stabilisation
coefficients displayed in column 3 of table 1; (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at
90%, 95%, resp. 99% level of confidence; Swd is Sweden; see text for further
explanation.
Equation (1) in table 3 shows the results when all three determinants are included in the
regression and Sweden is left out in the calculations. Both the government size and
fiscal prudence have the expected sign and are significant at conventional levels,
whereas the coefficient for openness, though having the expected sign, is insignificant.
Apparently, the potential spillover effects of budgetary stabilisation do not play a role in
the composition of government budgetary policy. A possible explanation for this result
is that openness may be relevant once a country contemplates a discretionary, counter-
cyclical policy measure, but that this consideration does not play a role in deciding
upon, for example, the tax structure or the generosity of the social security system. An
alternative explanation is that the incentive-reducing effect in an open economy to
provide stabilisation given the variability of the business cycle is counteracted by an
increased desire for stabilisation, as open economies are more susceptible of external
shocks and therefore face a higher variability of the business cycle. Indeed, Rodrik
(1996) provides evidence that more open economies have bigger governments in order
to cushion the amount of external risk. However, note that – to the extent that openness
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has the effect suggested by Rodrik10 – this effect is directly captured in our equations by
government size itself rather than by the coefficient for openness.
Equation's. (2) in table 3 shows the coefficients for government size and
budgetary sustainability, when openness is dropped. The fit of the regression improves,
with an adjusted R2 of 0.47. Moreover, both the value and the significance of the
coefficient for budgetary sustainability rises. Equation (3) repeats this equation, but now
including Sweden in the sample. Notwithstanding a slight drop in significance,11 the
coefficient for budgetary sustainability increases from 0.64 to 0.92.
These results provide evidence of a substantial and statistically significant
relation between government debt and budgetary stabilisation on the other hand. The
coefficients for government debt in equations (2) and (3) – 0.64 resp. 0.92 – indicate
that a lower debt ratio of 10% GDP is associated with an increase of the stabilisation
coefficient of 0.078. Belgium serves as a nice illustration of the potential relevance of
budgetary prudence on budgetary stabilisation. The average Belgian debt amounts to
almost 120% GDP (see table A2 in the appendix) over the relevant sample period,
whereas the average EU debt to GDP ratio is slightly above 60% GDP. An increase of
the stabilisation coefficient with 0.078 (the average of 0.064 and 0.092) for every 10%
GDP decline in debt implies that the stabilisation coefficient associated with a Belgian
debt ratio of 60% GDP (instead of the actual 120% GDP) is 0.58 rather than the actual
0.11. Thus the estimated relation between government debt and budgetary stabilisation
suggests that the former almost fully accounts for the low degree of budgetary
stabilisation in Belgium.
More in general, the results indicate that a high level of government debt as a
share of GDP has a deteriorating influence on the degree of budgetary stabilisation. To
put it differently, the data suggest that budgetary sustainability is positively rather than
negatively related to budgetary stabilisation, thereby answering the question posed in
the title of this paper negatively.
Some closer check for robustness of the results is necessary, as the sample
consists of only 13 (or even 12, if Sweden is excluded) observations. Therefore, we
checked for robustness in several ways. First, equations (2) and (3) are repeated,
including a constant. The resulting impact on the coefficients for government size and
the debt ratio are shown in equations (4) and (5). The constant is insignificant in both
specifications. Moreover, including a constant appears to have only a negligible
influence on both the value and the significance of the debt coefficient.12 Secondly, in
equations (6) and (7) presented in table 3, government income, instead of government
expenditure, is used as a measure of government size. This leads to a decline in both the
value (with 0.15 – 0.2) and the significance of the coefficient for budgetary
                                                          
10 For the countries in our sample, we found a positive, but insignificant, relation between
openness and government size.
11 Significance drops from 99.4% to 97.7% if Sweden is included in the equation.
12 For one reason or another, including a constant leads to an insignificant coefficient for
government size in the specification where Sweden is excluded from the sample.
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sustainability. If Sweden is excluded, the level of significance falls from 99.5% to
98.5%. If Sweden is included, the decline is from 98.7% to 96%.13
A more fundamental deviation from the benchmark specification is obtained by
using an alternative measure for budgetary sustainability. Indeed, the results in table 4
are obtained by substituting the average debt ratio for the average budget balance over
the relevant sample period. Naturally, in this case the hypothesis is that countries
showing relatively large budget deficits over the period concerned will have ceteris
paribus smaller stabilisation coefficients than countries with small deficits.14
Table 4 Impact of government size, budgetary sustainability (budget balance),
and openness on the degree of stabilisation
                                                Explanatory variables
Government size Budgetary
Sustainability
Openness R2 / R2-adj. Remarks
Eq. (1) 1.68*** 3.62** - 0.66* 0.51 / 0.40 Excl. Swd
Eq. (2) 2.28*** 5.20* - 1.11* 0.56 / 0.47 Incl. Swd
Eq. (3) 1.23*** 4.14** - 0.29 / 0.22 Excl. Swd
Eq. (4) 1.59*** 6.51* - 0.39 / 0.33 Incl. Swd
Equations are estimated without a constant; explanatory variables are all measured as
percentage of GDP; a budget deficit (surplus) is defined negatively (positively); the
coefficients indicate the partial relation between the explanatory variables on the actual
cumulative stabilisation coefficients displayed in column 3 of table 1; (*), (**), (***)
indicate significance at 90%, 95%, resp. 99% level of confidence; Swd is Sweden; see
text for further explanation.
If sustainability is defined in terms of the average budget balance, openness
gains in significance, though the variable remains insignificant at the 95% level of
confidence. Hence, before dropping openness, we run a regression including Sweden in
the sample. As shown by equation (2), this leads to a deterioration of the significance of
the budget balance, which is in fact only narrowly significant at 90%. The coefficient
for openness – besides being not significant in any of the two cases – appears to be quite
sensitive with respect to whether or not Sweden is included in the sample. The
                                                          
13 If the average of government income and expenditure as share of GDP is inserted, the
value and the significance of the coefficients are almost exactly in the middle of the
results presented for inserting government income and expenditure separately.
14 None of the countries in our sample has an average budget surplus over the period
concerned.
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coefficient almost doubles when Sweden is included. Therefore, we tend to reject that a
statistically significant relation exists between openness and budgetary stabilisation.
Nevertheless, dropping openness leads to a substantial decline in (adjusted) R2, as is
shown by equations (3) and (4) in table 4. The average value for the budget coefficient
is about 5.25. This implies that an average budget deficit that is higher by 1% GDP is
associated in our cross-country sample with a decline in the stabilisation coefficient of
about 0.0525. Again, a better intuition of this quantitative effect is obtained by an
illustration. Table A2 of the appendix shows that the average budget deficit (relative to
GDP) for the Netherlands amounts to 3.7% GDP over the relevant sample period. If the
Netherlands had shown a balanced budget over the relevant sample period, we would
expect a Dutch stabilisation coefficient of 0.78 instead of the estimated 0.59.
Moreover, the significance of the budget deficit as an explanatory variable for
the degree of stabilisation is less robust than the significance of the debt ratio. If
Sweden is included in the sample, the level of significance drops to 94%, even below
the 95% level of confidence. Finally, if government expenditure is replaced by
government income as a measure of government size, the variable for the budget
balance narrowly drops below the 90% level of confidence.
Though the results show that the budget balance has the expected sign and is
generally statistically significant, the partial relation with budgetary stabilisation is
clearly less robust than the partial relation between government debt and budgetary
stabilisation. This seems to confirm our hypothesis that the average debt (as a share of
GDP) over a certain period of time is from a theoretical point of view a better indicator
for the degree of budgetary sustainability during that period than the average budget
balance.
5 Concluding remarks
The need for having rules on budgetary sustainability in EMU is generally accepted by
now. This paper investigates whether such rules may be at the cost of budgetary
stabilisation at the national level. Such a potential trade-off between rules on budgetary
stability and the desired budgetary flexibility for stabilisation purposes is an important
issue when it comes to assessing the question as to whether – and if so: how – budgetary
stabilisation should be subject to close policy co-ordination. This paper argues that there
is no convincing economic rationale to favour such a policy co-ordination. First, with
respect to the efficacy of budgetary stabilisation, this paper argues that commonly used
arguments in favour of centralised stabilisation such as policy spillovers, Ricardian
equivalence effects and mobility of tax bases are either empirically less relevant or
theoretically flawed. Second, the empirical estimates presented in this paper suggest that
the degree of intertemporal budgetary stabilisation in EU countries is as least as large as
the degree of interregional stabilisation built-in into the US federal budget.
This leaves open the possibility that such policy co-ordination is desirable
because countries do not have sufficient policy room for budgetary stabilisation, be it
automatic or discretionary, due to the rules on budgetary sustainability laid down in the
Stability and Growth Pact. This paper contributes to this discussion, by arguing that a
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sustainable budgetary position is a prerequisite for budgetary stabilisation. Along this
line of reasoning, it follows that budgetary sustainability and budgetary stabilisation
strengthen rather than hinder each other. Consequently, by providing countries an
incentive for pursuing prudent budgetary policy, the budgetary rules enshrined in the
Stability and Growth Pact may be considered beneficial, rather than irrelevant or even
harmful, from a stabilisation point of view. The main contribution of this paper is that it
presents empirical evidence showing a substantial and statistically highly significant
partial relation between government debt as a measure of budgetary sustainability and
the actual degree of stabilisation. Depending upon the exact specification, the data
indicate that an increase in the debt-GDP ratio of 10% is associated with a drop in
stabilisation of about 0.075 – 0.08 at an average stabilisation coefficient of about 0.5.
We also find suggestive evidence showing a negative relation between (average) budget
deficits and budgetary stabilisation, though these results are less robust than the
estimates using the debt ratio as a measure of budgetary sustainability. We conclude
that no trade-off exists between budgetary sustainability and budgetary stabilisation. On
the contrary, budgetary stabilisation requires a sustainable budgetary position implying
that, in this case, rules and flexibility may go hand in hand.
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Table A1 Detailed results of the regression analysis in section 3
Country c β1 β2 β1+β2 Wald β3 β4
Austria - 0.15
(1.18)
0.34
(2.85)
0.49 0.03 - -
Belgium - 0.61
(3.20)
- 0.50
(2.59)
0.11 0.00 - -
Denmark - 0.29
(1.41)
0.33
(1.91)
0.62 0.08 - -
Finland - 0.56
(3.37)
0.24
(1.48)
0.80 0.01 - 0.19
(1.97)
0.16
(1.45)
France -1.06
(3.27)
0.35
(2.70)
0.13
(1.00)
0.48 0.03 - 0.56
(3.64)
-
Germany - 1.1
(3.47)
0.25
(3.77)
- 0.25 - -0.47
(4.48)
-
Ireland 1.43
(2.91)
0.15
(1.01)
- 0.15 - - -
Italy - 5.67
(2.86)(
0.41
(2.78)
- 0.41 - - 0.55
(2.93)
-
Netherlands - 1.8
(3.47)
0.36
(2.45)
0.23
(1.56)
0.59 0.03 - 0.37
(3.17)
-
Portugal - 3.75
(3.95)
0.22
(1.74)
0.19
(1.56)
0.41 0.05 - 0.64
(4.39)
-
Spain -1.88
(2.86)
0.41
(2.57)
- 0.41 - - 0.34
(2.42)
Sweden - 1.63
(5.58)
- 1.63 - - -
UK - 0.31
(2.12)
0.26
(1.78)
0.57 0.00 - -
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Table A1  Continued
Country Dummy R2 / R2-adj DW Br-Go Period Obs
Austria - 0.29 / 0.26 2.23 0.56 ‘75-
‘98
23
Belgium ’93: 0.85
(1.86)
0.55 / 0.49 1.60 0.73 ‘78-
‘98
19
Denmark - 0.46 / 0.40 1.56 0.59 ‘89-
‘98
10
Finland - 0.79 / 0.75 2.44 0.26 ‘80-
‘98
19
France '92: -1.54
(2.77)
0.60 / 0.52 1.68 0.40 ‘75-
’98
24
Germany - 0.70 / 0.66 1.60 Na '76-'98 20
Ireland ’90: -1.01
(1.49)
0.17 / 0.05 1.80 0.83 ‘82-
‘98
17
Italy '96: 4.42
(3.88)
0.61 / 0.55 2.15 0.57 ‘75-
‘98
24
Netherlands 91: 1.13
(2.78)
0.54 / 0.45 2.44 0.22 '75-98 24
Portugal ‘92: 1.49
(2.17)
0.62 / 0.53 2.51 Na '75-98 22
Spain '96: 1.92
(3.29)
0.65 / 0.58 2.32 0.25 ‘80-
‘98
19
Sweden '96: 3.13
(2.83
0.75 / 0.73 2.22 0.60 ‘84-
‘98
15
UK '96: 1.71
(2.68)
0.59 / 0.55 1.80 0.71 ‘79-
‘98
20
Data used are from OECD Economic Outlook 65, June 1999; t-values are between
parenthesis, Wald gives the probability of joint significance of β1 and β2; Br-Go gives
the probability of serial correlation using a Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test
(1 lag), under the null that no serial correlation exists.
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Table A2  Measures for government size, budgetary sustainability, and openness as
used in eq. (2) of section 4
Country Stabilisation
coefficient
Gvmt
expenditure
Gvmt
income
Debt
(% GDP)
Budget
(%GDP)
Openness Period
Austria 0.49 49.2 46.2 50.2 -3.04 41 ‘75-‘98
Belgium 0.11 56.8 49.7 119.5 -7.02 65 ‘80-‘98
Denmark 0.62 57.8 56.5 69.5 -1.28 35 ‘89-’98
Finland 0.80 44.6 46.8 25.3 2.15 27 ‘80-‘98
France 0.48 50.1 47.4 43.2 -2.69 25 ‘75-‘98
Germany 0.25 47.6 45.1 43.1 -2.52 25 ‘76-‘98
Ireland 0.15 43.0 38.2 94.0 -4.76 61 ‘82-‘98
Italy 0.41 49.0 39.5 89.6 -9.55 18 ‘82-‘98
Netherlands 0.59 54.2 50.5 65.1 -3.69 49 ‘75-‘98
Portugal 0.41 39.0 33.8 51.6 -5.19 33 ‘75-‘98
Spain 0.41 41.0 36.6 52.5 -4.51 24 ‘80-‘98
Sweden 1.63 61.2 59.3 57.6 -1.93 28 ‘83-‘98
UK 0.57 42.7 39.6 53.5 -3.19 25 ‘79-‘98
Average 0.52 49.0 45.3 62.7 -3.6 35
Openness is defined as ½ (export+import) / GDP; data are from OECD Economic
Outlook 65, June 1999.
